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Abstract
The evolution of the inter‐institutional balance of powers has been a constant feature of the European integration process.
Therefore, this thematic issue reopens these theoretical and empirical discussions by looking at an underexploited angle
of research, namely the impact of rule change on policy outputs. We offer a discussion on how to theorise rule change,
actors’ behaviour, and their impact on policy outputs. We also examine the links between theory and methods, noting the
strengths and weaknesses of different methods for the study of institutional and policy change. We draw on the contribu‐
tions of this thematic issue to delineate further paths to push forward the current frontiers in EU decision‐making research.
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1. Introduction
The evolution of the inter‐institutional balance of pow‐
ers has been a constant feature of the European integra‐
tion process. The debate on ‘whowins, who loses’ is now
at a crossroads: On the one hand, the EU supranational
institutions (the Commission, the European Parliament
[EP], and the European Court of Justice) have been rein‐
forced in successive constitutional treaties (Dehousse,
2011); on the other hand, the successive crises, which
have affected policy areas close to the sovereignty of
member states, have reinforced the role of executives
and favoured non‐legislative forms of decision‐making
(Puetter, 2014).
Therefore, this thematic issue reopens the theoret‐
ical and empirical discussions about inter‐institutional
power dynamics in EU decision‐making by looking at an
underexploited angle of research, namely the impact of
rule change on policy outputs. While numerous stud‐
ies have assessed the consequences of rule change for
the inter‐institutional balance of power (e.g., Farrell &
Héritier, 2003; Kreppel, 2018), the question of how rule
change affects policy outputs has barely been touched
upon. Existing research has focused on a limited pool
of policy areas and concentrated on the role of the EP
(Bressanelli & Chelotti, 2018; Burns et al., 2013; Ripoll
Servent, 2015) and the rising powers of the European
Council (Bickerton et al., 2015).
This extensive literature points to inconclusive and
often contradictory conclusions on the effects that rule
change has on the power of EU institutional actors and
policy outputs. Therefore, this introduction reflects on
how we theorise rule change, actors’ behaviour, and
their impact on policy outputs. We also discuss the links
between theory and methods, noting the strengths and
weaknesses of different methods for the study of insti‐
tutional and policy change. We draw on the contribu‐
tions of this thematic issue to delineate further paths
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to push forward the current frontiers in EU decision‐
making research.
2. Understanding Rule and Policy Change in EU
Decision‐Making
We consider that rule change cannot have an indepen‐
dent impact on policy outputs; its influence is mediated
by the interpretations and use that actors make of these
new rules (Figure 1). In addition, we are interested in
understanding both positive and negative instances of
policy change.
We consider three main sources of rule change.
First, formal changes equate to treaty reforms and
inter‐institutional agreements. The introduction of co‐
decision in the Treaty of Maastricht and its subsequent
modification and expansion in Amsterdam and Lisbon
is a central instance of formal rule change. However,
‘interstitial’ processes emerging from informal practices
in‐between treaty changes (Farrell & Héritier, 2007) have
often had more pervasive effects than formal changes.
A good example is the increase in early agreements
and the use of trilogues in co‐decision (Brandsma et al.,
2021). Informal changes have also been the product of
crises that have empowered executive organs such as
the European Council, the Commission, the European
Central Bank, and EU agencies.
Rule change may have different types of effects:
First, it might introduce new actors into the field, as
we have seen with the gradual empowerment of the
EP as a co‐legislator. Second, it might modify formal
competences: The last treaty reforms saw a crucial shift
from regulatory competences to EU involvement in core
state powers, such as economic and monetary poli‐
cies as well as justice and home affairs (Genschel &
Jachtenfuchs, 2016). Finally, rule change can also act as
a window of opportunity, notably when coupled with
crises and uncertainty.
On the other hand, the study of policy change is
often unsystematic, making it difficult to compare find‐
ings.We invite researchers to ask themselves: First, what
is the status quo? Is it previous EU legislation?What was
the status quo before any EU legislation was in place?
What is the actual implementation on the ground once
EU legislation has been adopted? Second, to what extent
has the content of the policies changed (quantity)? Third,
how deep does this change go (quality)?
Finally, we need to assess whether these
(non‐)changes can actually be attributed to the (strate‐
gic) use of rule change by specific actors since not all
policy changes will have their source in the rule change.
Indeed, rule change is a necessary but not sufficient con‐
dition for policy change; therefore, in order to explain
outcomes, we need to pay particular attention to the
mechanisms of policy change. Policy entrepreneurs
might mobilise different types of mechanisms based on
actor‐centred strategies (e.g., purposefully including or
excluding certain actors), ideas (framing solutions, link‐
ing issues), and processes (shifting venues, using norms
to legitimise certain decisions).
3. Studying Rule and Policy Change in EU
Decision‐Making
Explaining the linkage between rule and policy change
requires a broadmethodological toolbox. In the past, the
effects of changes in formal and informal rules have been
dominated by formal modelling and quantitative meth‐
ods which have provided general explanations about
decision‐making but often failed to account for themech‐
anisms leading to policy change. On the other hand, qual‐
itative studies have remained compartmentalised and
often failed to describe the general picture across pol‐
icy fields.
The study of rule and policy change in EU decision‐
making has been dominated by game‐theoretical and
spatial models. These models consider that, taken
together, actors’ preferences, the location of the status
quo, and the EUprocedures determine policies (Crombez
& Vangerven, 2014, p. 290). Formal models contributed
greatly to the understanding of the different EU legisla‐
tive procedures, the power of the EU institutions, and
the degree of gridlock. However, they often failed to
take the increased informalisation of EU legislative pro‐
cedures into account and have tended to treat EU insti‐
tutions as homogenous actors (Thomson et al., 2006).
Some of these caveats have been addressed by
bargaining models which use expert interviews, voting
behaviour, or EP election manifestos to locate actors’
positions on specific policy issues (e.g., Hix et al., 2007;
Thomson et al., 2006). However, one of the main difficul‐
ties in using quantitative methods to study rule and pol‐
icy change comes from the availability and quality of data.
Indeed, formal powers, partisan ideologies, and parlia‐
mentary amendments provide only an approximation of
influence and policy positions, as they do not capture, for
example, informal negotiations, and they often measure
only the revealed/strategic preferences of actors.
These details can be captured with qualitative






Figure 1. How rule change affects policy change.
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understanding of their functions and power. A sizeable
body of work has analysed the impact of rule and insti‐
tutional change on the substance of European policies,
such as agriculture (Greer, 2005), macroeconomic poli‐
cies (Hodson, 2011), environment (Burns & Carter, 2010),
justice and home affairs (Tacea, 2018; Trauner & Ripoll
Servent, 2015), and social policies (Falkner et al., 2005).
These studies offer in‐depth analyses of the conditions
andmechanisms in different policy areas. However,most
of them are case studies examining very salient EU pro‐
posals and focusing on new areas of EU activity, which
limits their generalisability beyond their policy field.
4. Contributions of This Thematic Issue
The contributions of this thematic issue offer significant
insights on the effects of rules change on policy change
by combining quantitative and qualitative perspectives.
Most contributions depart from Lisbon as the most sig‐
nificant turning point for the EU’s architecture in the last
decades. The expansion of co‐decision and consent have
made a significant difference, both in formal and infor‐
mal terms (Gravey & Buzogány, 2021; Laloux & Panning,
2021; Peffenköver & Adriaensen, 2021; Piquet, 2021;
Tacea, 2021). Zeilinger (2021) underlines how, despite
its limited role in labour market and social policies, the
Commission acts as a policy entrepreneur in these areas
through Country‐Specific‐Recommendations. However,
we also see that crises have served as crucial windows
of opportunity, especially for the Commission, which has
often used them to redefine its powers in areas where
it did not have strong competences (Vaagland, 2021;
Zeilinger, 2021).
When it comes to the mechanisms of change, we
see how rule changes have indeed led to new forms of
competition that force us to assess winners and losers
beyond the traditional institutional triangle. Several con‐
tributions show that the Commission is now more
dependent on the EP, which has led to new forms of
early consultation and cooperation in formal procedures
(Gravey & Buzogány, 2021; Peffenköver & Adriaensen,
2021). However, this dependency has also pushed the
Commission to strategically increase the use of non‐
legislative procedures in order to circumvent the leg‐
islative powers of the EP (Tacea, 2021; Vaagland, 2021).
Indeed, in a context of higher politicisation and con‐
flict, Commission actors have been particularly effec‐
tive in re‐framing proposals or linking them to other
issues to expand their chances of success (or block
alternative understandings). Laloux and Panning (2021)
show the importance of anticipating conflicts to explain
the success of individual Commissioners, which often
involves re‐framing and issue‐linkage to mobilise epis‐
temic communities around an idea (Vaagland, 2021;
Zeilinger, 2021). Finally, we see how politicisation has
become crucial to explain the role of actors in proac‐
tively using the decision‐making process to bias or block
policy change. This is particularly visible in a highly frag‐
mented European Parliament, which makes it easier for
particularistic interests and those happy with the status
quo towin (Gravey & Buzogány, 2021; Vinciguerra, 2021).
Piquet (2021) and Peffenköver and Adriaensen (2021)
also show the crucial role that inter‐actor communica‐
tion plays in understanding how gridlock and unwanted
policy change can be prevented.
By using quantitative, qualitative, and text‐mining
techniques, this thematic issue bridges the gap between
empirical case studies and large‐N analyses. Indeed,
various contributions show the advantages of using
process‐tracing and structured (theory‐led) comparisons
to uncover the mechanisms linking rule and policy
change (Peffenköver & Adriaensen, 2021; Vaagland,
2021; Vinciguerra, 2021; Zeilinger, 2021). Piquet (2021),
Gravey and Buzogány (2021), and Vinciguerra (2021)
demonstrate the importance of mixed methods to
exploremechanisms and explain patterns of rule and pol‐
icy change. Finally, Laloux and Panning (2021) and Tacea
(2021) use text mining to capture how much change
an actor introduces during the legislative process and
explain their success/failure. Therefore, the thematic
issue demonstrates the need to strengthen the dialogue
between institutionalists and policy analysts but also
between formal modellers, quantitative, and qualitative
researchers in order to gain a better understanding of the
patterns and mechanisms of change and stability in EU
decision‐making.
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